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Existing estimates of power laws in rm size typically ignore the impact of international trade.
Using a simple theoretical framework, we show that international trade systematically aects
the distribution of rm size: the power law exponent among exporting rms should be strictly
lower in absolute value than the power law exponent among non-exporting rms. We use a
dataset of French rms to demonstrate that this prediction is strongly supported by the data.
While estimates of power law exponents have been used to pin down parameters in theoretical
and quantitative models, our analysis implies that the existing estimates are systematically
lower than the true values. We propose two simple ways of estimating power law parameters
that take explicit account of exporting behavior.
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Many relationships in economics appear to be governed by power laws. A distributional power
law is a relationship of the type: Pr(X > x) = Cx  where Pr(X > x) is the probability that a
random variable X is greater than x, and C and  are constants. Power laws arise in a variety
of contexts, such as the distribution city size (Zipf 1949), income (Champernowne 1953), rm size
(Axtell 2001), and sectoral trade ows (Hinloopen and van Marrewijk 2006, Easterly, Reshef and
Schwenkenberg 2009).1
The literature has emphasized the importance of the precise value of the power law exponent,
. For instance, for the distribution of rm size, Axtell (2001) reports a range of estimates between
0.996 and 1.059, very precisely estimated with standard errors between 0.054 and 0.064.2 The
literature has sought to both explain why  is close to 1 { a phenomenon known as Zipf's Law {
and to explore its implications in a variety of contexts. It has been argued that Zipf's Law will
arise when the variable of interest { be it city, or rm size { follows a geometric Brownian motion
(Gabaix 1999, Luttmer 2007, Rossi-Hansberg and Wright 2007). At the same time, the precise
magnitude of the power law exponent has been shown to matter for such dierent phenomena as
macroeconomic uctuations (Gabaix 2009b, di Giovanni and Levchenko 2009a), regulation of entry
(di Giovanni and Levchenko 2009b), and executive compensation (Gabaix and Landier 2007).
This paper revisits the power law in the distribution of rm size in the context of international
trade. We rst set up a simple version of the Melitz (2003) model of production and trade, adopting
the common assumption that the distribution of rm productivities is Pareto. This model is
naturally suited to studying the rm size distribution because of its emphasis on heterogeneous
rms. The Melitz-Pareto framework delivers a power law in rm size. However, it also predicts
that in the presence of international trade, the power law exponent in the distribution of rm size is
not constant. Because larger rms are more likely to export, and the more productive the rm, the
more markets it serves, we would expect the estimated power law exponent to be lower in absolute
value among exporting rms compared to the non-exporting ones. In other words, in the presence
of international trade, power law estimates that do not take into account international trade could
be misleading regarding the deep parameters of the economy.3
We evaluate these predictions of the Melitz-Pareto model using the data on production and
exports for a large sample of French rms. In the full sample that includes all rms, the power law in
rm size is strikingly similar to what Axtell (2001) found for the census of U.S. rms. The estimated
power law exponent and the t of the relationship are both nearly identical. However, when we
1See Gabaix (2009a) for a recent survey.
2The t of this relationship is typically very close. The R
2's reported by Axtell (2001) are in excess of 0.99.
3This paper focuses on power law estimation because power laws appear to be the best description of observed rm
size distributions (Luttmer 2007). However, the qualitative mechanisms we highlight apply to any other underlying
distribution of rm size.
1separate the rms into exporting and non-exporting ones, it turns out that in the exporting sample,
the power law coecient is consistently lower, while in the non-exporting sample, consistently
higher than in the full sample of rms. This dierence is present across all estimators, and highly
statistically signicant.
We then provide several pieces of supporting evidence that international trade changes the
distribution of rms size in ways predicted by theory. First, we show that the power law exponent
for exporting rms converges to the power law exponent for domestic rms as we restrict the sample
to larger and larger exporters. And second, the power law coecients exhibit the same pattern
at the disaggregated industry level as well. Furthermore, at sector level the dierences between
power law coecients are larger in sectors that are more open to trade, a striking regularity that
is consistent with the theoretical intuition developed in the paper. All of these pieces of evidence
lend empirical support to the main idea of the paper: international trade systematically changes
the distribution of rm size, and inference that does not take that into account will likely lead to
biased estimates.
One of the reasons empirical power law estimates are important is that they can be used to
pin down crucial parameters in calibrated heterogeneous rms models (see, among many others,
Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple 2004, Chaney 2008, Buera and Shin 2008, di Giovanni and Levchenko
2009a). At the same time, quantitative results often depend very sharply on the precise parameter
values that govern the distribution of rm size. Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009b) show that
welfare gains from reductions in xed costs are an order of magnitude lower, and gains from
reductions in variable costs an order of magnitude higher in a model calibrated to Zipf's Law
compared to the counterfactual case in which  = 2 instead. We return to the Melitz-Pareto
model, and propose two alternative ways of estimating the power law parameters that are internally
consistent with the canonical heterogeneous rms model of trade. The rst is to use a sample of
only non-exporting rms. The second is to use only domestic sales to estimate the power law
parameter.
We are not the rst to provide parameter estimates for the rm size distribution that explicitly
account for international trade. Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2008) set up a multi-country hetero-
geneous rms model and estimate a set of model parameters with Simulated Method of Moments
using the data on French rms.4 The advantage of our approach is simplicity. The alternative
estimation strategies proposed here are very easy to implement and do not require any additional
modeling or estimation techniques. All they rely on is an appropriate modication of the sample
or variables used in estimation. Our approach thus substantially lowers the barriers to obtaining
reliable power law estimates, and can be applied easily in many contexts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework.
4See Arkolakis (2008, 2009) for related theoretical treatments.
2Section 3 describes the dataset used in the analysis and the methodology for estimating power
laws. Section 4 describes the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework













where cni is consumption of good i in country n, pni is the price of this good, Yn is total expenditure
in the economy, and Jn is the mass of varieties consumed in country n, coming from all countries.













Each country has a mass  In of potential (but not actual) entrepreneurs. For what we wish
to illustrate, it does not matter whether  In solves a free entry condition as in Melitz (2003) and
Helpman et al. (2004), or  In is simply a xed endowment as in Eaton and Kortum (2005) and
Chaney (2008). Each potential entrepreneur can produce a unique CES variety, and thus has some
market power. There are both xed and variable costs of production and trade. At the beginning of
the period, each potential entrant i 2 [0;  In] in each market n learns its type, which is the marginal
cost ai. On the basis of this cost, each entrepreneur in country n decides whether or not to pay
the xed cost of production f, and which, if any, export markets to serve. Let !n be the price of
the input bundle in country n. Technology is linear in the input bundle: a rm with marginal cost
ai must use ai units of the input bundle to produce one unit of its nal output. As an example,
if there is only one factor of production, labor, then the cost of the input bundle is simply the
wage !n = wn. Alternatively, in an economy with both labor and capital and a Cobb-Douglas
production function, the cost of the input bundle is (up to a constant) !n = w
nr1 
n , where rn is
the return to capital in country n.
Firm i from country n selling to its domestic market faces a demand curve given by (1), and
has a marginal cost !nai of serving this market. As is well known, the prot maximizing price
is a constant markup over marginal cost, pni = "


















= Mn  Bi;







is a measure of the size of domestic demand, which is the same for
all rms, and Bi  a1 "
i is the rm-specic (but not market-specic) productivity-cum-sales term.






The rm sells domestically only if its variable prots cover the xed costs of setting up production:
Di="  f. This denes the minimum size of the rm observed in this economy, D = "f, as well as








To start exporting from country n to country m, rm i must pay the xed cost mni that varies
by rm, and an iceberg per-unit cost of mn > 1.5 We normalize the iceberg cost of domestic










is m's market size from the perspective of the rm that exports there
from n, and Bi is dened above. As before, variable prots from exporting are equal to M
mBi=",





The xed cost of exporting to a foreign market is stochastic and varies from rm to rm, as in Eaton
et al. (2008). Thus, there will not be a single \exporting cuto," above which all rms export, and
below which none do. Instead, our formulation delivers both exporting and non-exporting rms
with the same exact productivity, or equivalently, domestic sales.
The production structure of the economy is pinned down by the number of rms from each
country that enter each market. Using this information, one can express Pn in terms of Yn and
!n, for all countries. The model can be closed by solving for the Yn's and !n's. To do this, we
must impose balanced trade and factor market clearing for each country, as well as a free entry
condition if we assume that  In is endogenous. We do not pursue the full solution to this model
here, since it is not necessary to derive our main predictions (for an example, see di Giovanni and
Levchenko 2009b). Instead, we describe the analytical power law relationship in the distribution of
rm size.
2.1 Power Law in Firm Size, With and Without International Trade
In this section, we rst demonstrate the power law in an autarkic economy, and then discuss how
the distribution of rm size is aected by international trade. Firm sales, Si, in the economy follow
5That is, the rm in country n must ship mn > 1 units to country m in order for one unit of the good to arrive
there.
4a power law if their distribution is described by:
Pr(Si > s) = Cs : (3)
We postulate that Bi follows a Pareto distribution with exponent . Under some conditions (e.g.,
Gabaix 1999, Luttmer 2007), Bi comes from a random growth model, which yields a value of  close
to 1. It turns out that in our model this is equivalent to assuming that rm productivity is Pareto,
but with a dierent exponent. To see this, suppose that rm productivity, 1=a Pareto(b;), and





. In the autarkic economy, where Si = Di, the
power law follows:







































" 1 and  = 
" 1. The model-implied distribution of sales is
depicted in Figure 1. In addition, this calculation shows that Si Pareto(b" 1Mn; 
" 1).
This relationship { the power law exponent constant and equal to 
" 1 { holds true in autarky,
and also among non-exporting rms in the trade equilibrium. But how does exporting behavior
change the rm size distribution? We describe two mechanisms by which exporting tilts the power
law relationship systematically to make it atter (more right-skewed). The rst relies on entry
into progressively more foreign markets. The second, on stochastic export market entry costs that
vary by rm. In the second case, it is possible to obtain a number of analytical results about the
distribution of rm sales, and show that it is systematically aected by exporting behavior.
Consider rst the case of multiple export markets. For simplicity, let mni = mn 8i. In the
presence of rm heterogeneity and xed costs of entering export markets, there is a hierarchy of
rms in their export market participation. For each potential export market m, equation (2) denes
a partition of rms according to how many markets the rm serves. From this expression it is clear
that a rm will rst serve a market that is closer (low mn and mn), has larger size (high Ym),
and lower competition (high Pm). We can order potential export destinations according to how
productive a rm needs to be in order to export there. This is illustrated in Figure 2, which orders
rms according to marginal cost, with more productive rms closer to the origin. Since each rm
in the home country faces the same aggregate conditions and trade costs in each trading partner,
if a rm exports to any market, it also exports to all markets served by the less productive rms.
What this implies for the distribution of rm sales is illustrated in Figure 1. For all the rms
that only sell to the domestic market, the power law is still a straight line with the same slope
as what we derived for autarky, 
" 1. However, participation in export markets results in a series
5of parallel shifts in this cumulative distribution function, one for each additional export market
that rms might enter. Because the more productive a rm is, the more markets it sells to, the
distribution of rm size becomes more fat-tailed.
The second mechanism that tilts the power law in rm size is the stochastic xed costs of
exporting that vary across rms. To obtain a number of analytical results, we assume that there
is only one export market m. Clearly, this should be thought of as a composite of the potential
for global sales of the company. This framework would thus apply particularly well if there is a
considerable xed cost common to entering any and all foreign markets, but once a rm exports to
one country, it nds it much easier to export to others.6 The notation will be simplied considerably
































We will call H(x) the \export probability function": a rm with domestic size Di exports with
probability H (Di), which is weakly increasing in Di. If the rm exports, the exports are Xi =
M





" < i; probability 1   H (Di)
Di if
Di
"  i; probability H (Di).
(5)





" < i; probability 1   H (Di)
(1 + )Di if
Di
"  i; probability H (Di).
(6)
The distributions of domestic sales, export sales, and total sales are described in the following
proposition. The proof is presented in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 The densities of domestic sales Di, exports Xi (when they are nonzero), and world-
wide sales Si are:
pD (x) = kx  11x>D
6Hanson and Xiang (2008) use U.S. motion picture exports to provide empirical evidence that xed exporting
costs are global rather market-specic.






pS (x) = kx  1









1x>(1+)D + kx  11D<x<(1+)D; (8)
where k = D, K is a constant ensuring
R
pX (x)dx = 1, and 1f:g is the indicator function.
In other words, when the underlying distribution of productivity, and therefore domestic sales,
is Pareto, the presence of exporting behavior implies that the distribution of total sales, as well
as export sales, is systematically dierent. Thus, the standard practice of estimating power laws
in rm size based on total rm sales will not yield reliable estimates of the underlying power law
parameter, , which is in turn often used to calibrate the model parameter combination, =(" 1).
As is evident from equation (8) that describes the distribution of total sales, tting instead the
simple power law relationship (3) will not yield the correct estimate of the power law exponent.
As an example, suppose that the distribution of xed exporting cost i is itself Pareto, with
some upper truncation: H (x=) = k00x, for x < x and some k00, and H (x=) = k00 (x)
 for
x > x. Then, equation (7) implies that the distribution of export sales is given by:
pX (x) /

x  1+ for x < x
x  1 for x  x,
and thus the power law exponent of X is:
X (x) =

    for x < x
 for x  x.
When H has a high slope, the Pareto exponent of X is lower than that of domestic sales: there are
fewer small exports, due to the selection eect coming from the xed cost of exporting. However,
in the region where the H function \saturates," the local Pareto exponent of exports converges to
the exponent of domestic sales. Such a possibility is depicted in Figure 3. We will provide evidence
consistent with this auxiliary prediction of the model in Section 4.1 below.
In summary, we have now described two mechanisms by which the estimated slope of the power
law among exporting rms is systematically lower in absolute value than the slope among the rms
that sell only to the domestic market, at least in some regions. The preceding discussion also
identies two ways of estimating the power law parameter that take explicit account of exporting
behavior. The rst, suggested by Figures 1 and 3, is to use only non-exporting rms in the
estimation of . The second, suggested by equation (4) and Proposition 1, is to estimate the power
law exponent on the rms' domestic sales only. We now test the theoretical predictions using a
comprehensive dataset on sales and exports of French rms, and present the results of implementing
the two simple alternative ways of estimating  that correct for the exporting behavior.
73 Data and Empirical Methodology
3.1 Data and Estimation Sample
To carry out the empirical analysis, we start with a comprehensive dataset that covers the entire
universe of French rms for 2006. The data are based on the mandatory reporting of rms' income
statements to tax authorities. What is crucial for our analysis is that each rm has to report the
breakdown of its total sales between domestic sales and exports. In total, the dataset includes
2,182,571 rms, of which 194,444 (roughly 9%) are exporters.
The exhaustive nature of the dataset implies that there are many observations for very small
rms, whose economic activity is practically nil, and are thus both uninformative and uninteresting
to the researcher. For our purposes, this is important because it is widely recognized that many
power laws t the data well only above a certain minimum size threshold (Axtell 2001, Luttmer
2007). Thus, a power law may not be a good description of the size distribution of very small rms.
To address this problem, we follow the common practice in the literature and pick the lower cuto
based on visual inspection (Gabaix 2009a). The minimum sales cuto we select is Euro750,000 of
annual sales.7 This cuto is quite low: though it results in the removal of a large number of rms
from the dataset, the dropped rms account for only 7.7% of total sales. Our results are robust to
a variety of cutos, including sales cutos as low as Euro100,000.
Since the focus of the paper is on how exporting behavior changes the rm size distribution,
we also omit non-tradeable sectors. The conventional approach to isolate the tradeable sector is
to focus exclusively on manufacturing. However, many sectors in agriculture, mining, and services
report non-trivial export sales as well. To broaden the denition of the tradeable sector, we only
drop industries for which total exports are less than 5% of total sales.8 The remaining sample (of
industries with exports of at least 5% of total sales) includes all of the manufacturing, agricultural,
and natural resource sectors, as well as some services such as consulting and wholesale trade. The
non-tradeable sector accounts for 51% of the total sales in the universe of French rms, so this
is a large reduction in the sample. However, all of our main results are robust to including the
non-traded sector in the estimation.
Table A1 provides descriptive statistics for the nal sample of domestic sales and exports. The
nal sample includes 157,084 rms, 67,078 of which are exporters (42.7%). An average exporter's
total sales are approximately four times larger than those of an average non-exporter (Euro 24.2
7This value also has an institutional justication: below this sales threshold, rms have the option of ling their
information according to simplied reporting requirements, while above it the rms must provide comprehensive
accounting data to tax authorities.
8This leads to dropping of Construction, Retail Trade, Real Estate, Financial Services, Post and Telecommunica-
tions, Business Services, Hotels and Restaurants, Recreational, Cultural, and Athletic Activities, Health and Social
Action, Public Administration, and Unions and Extra-Territorial Activities, most of which are plausibly non-tradeable
sectors.
8million vs. Euro 6.4 million).
3.2 Empirical Methodology
In order to obtain reliable estimates, this paper uses three standard methods of estimating the
slope of the power law . We now describe each in turn. The rst method, based on Axtell (2001),
makes direct use of the denition of the power law (3), which in natural logs becomes:
ln(Pr(Si > s)) = ln(C)    ln(s): (9)
For a grid of values of sales s, the estimated probability Pr(Si > s) is simply the number of rms
in the sample with sales greater than s divided by the total number of rms. We then regress
the natural log of this probability on ln(s) to obtain our rst estimate of . Following the typical
approach in the literature, we do this for the values of s that are equidistant from each other on
log scale. This implies that in absolute terms, the intervals containing low values of s are narrower
than the intervals at high values of s. This is done to get a greater precision of the estimates: since
there are fewer large rms, observations in small intervals for very high values of s would be more
noisy.
The second approach starts with the observation that the cdf in (3) has a probability density
function
f(s) = Cs (+1): (10)
To estimate this pdf, we divide the values of rm sales into bins of equal size on the log scale,
and compute the frequency as the number of rms in each bin divided by the width of the bin.
Since in absolute terms the bins are of unequal size, we regress the resulting frequency observations
on the value of s which is the geometric mean of the endpoints of the bin (this approach follows
Axtell 2001). Note that the resulting coecient is an estimate of  ( + 1), so when reporting the
results we subtract 1 from the estimate to recover a value of .
Alternatively, we simply regress the natural log of (Ranki   1=2) of each rm in the sales







= Constant + b LR lnSi + i;
where i indexes rms, and Si are sales. This is the estimator suggested by Gabaix and Ibragimov
(2008). The power law coecient b LR has a standard error of jb LRj(N=2) 1=2, where N is the
sample size. This standard error is reported throughout for this estimator. As we show below, in
practice the three estimators deliver remarkably similar results.
94 Results
We begin by replicating the conventional results in the literature that pool all rms and do not
consider exporting behavior. Table 1 reports estimates of the power law in rm size using the three
methods outlined above. We can see that the t of the data is quite similar to that reported in
existing studies: the R2's are all 99% or above. The point estimates of  are close to what Axtell
nds for the U.S.. Figure 4 presents the results graphically. The two panels show the cdf and pdf
of the power law in rm size. For convenience, each plot also reports the regression equation, the
t, and the number of rms underlying the estimation. It is clear that in these data on French
rms, the power law holds about as well as in the existing studies.
We now present the main results of the paper, which show that the power law in fact diers
signicantly between exporting and non-exporting rms as implied by theory. Table 2 reports
estimates of the power law for exporting and non-exporting rms separately. Columns (1), (3), and
(5) present the results of estimating power laws on exporting rms only, while columns (2), (4), and
(6) for non-exporting rms only. Once again, we report the estimate, standard error, R2, and the
number of rms for each estimate. Comparing the columns for exporters and non-exporters, we can
see the main result clearly. In every case, the exponent of the power law among exporting rms is
lower than that for non-exporting rms. In other words, the size distribution for exporting rms is
systematically more fat-tailed than the size distribution of the non-exporting ones. The dierence
is highly statistically signicant. Column (7) reports the t-statistic for the dierence between the
coecients in columns (5) and (6), and shows that they are in fact signicantly dierent.9 As we
argue above, while this is exactly what theory predicts, this aspect of the rm size distribution has
until now been ignored in the empirical literature.
A couple of other features of the results are worth noting. First, for all estimation methods, the
full-sample coecient from Table 1 is always between the exporting and the non-exporting sample
coecients in Table 2. This is exactly what we would expect. Second, we can see that the t of
the power law relationships in both subsamples is still quite good. The range of the R2's is 0.972
to 0.999. Once again, as predicted by theory, the simple power law describes the distribution of
exporting rms slightly less well, with R2's systematically lower for exporting than non-exporting
rms.
Figure 5 presents the results graphically. Panels (a) and (b) report the cdf and the pdf, respec-
tively. The cdf for exporting rms is everywhere atter and above the cdf for non-exporting ones.
At each size cuto, there are more larger rms that export than those that do not. The pdf plot
9We do not report the t-tests for whether the CDF and PDF coecients are statistically signicantly dierent
from each other, as those are \heuristic" estimators without a well-developed statistical model of standard errors.
Nonetheless, a simple t-test based on the coecients and standard errors reported in Table 2 always rejects equality
between the CDF and PDF coecents in Columns (1) compared to (2) and (3) compared to (4).
10conveys the same message.
4.1 Size Distribution For Exporting Firms: Nonlinearity and Saturation
One of the predictions of the two trade mechanisms outlined above is that for big enough exporting
rms, the power law coecient will converge back to the \true" . This would be the case either
because eventually all the big rms will have entered all markets, as in the lower right-hand corner of
Figure 1, or because the stochastic xed exporting costs have some upper bound, so that (nearly)
every rm above a certain productivity cuto nds it protable to export. To check for this
possibility, we re-estimated the power law in total sales for exporting rms while moving the lower
cuto. Theory predicts that as we constrain the sample to bigger and bigger exporting rms, the
power law coecient will get larger and larger in absolute value, converging eventually to , the
coecient for domestic rms. Figure 6 depicts the estimates of the power law in rm size for
exporting rms as a function of the lower sales cuto. That is, as we move to the right on the
horizontal axis, the power law is estimated on subsamples of bigger and bigger exporting rms.
In line with theory, as we move the cuto upwards, the power law coecient becomes larger
and larger in absolute value, converging to 1:029, the non-exporting rms coecient. The bottom
panel of the gure reports the R2 of the power law t. In the sample of exporting rms, as the
estimated coecient converges to the conceptually correct value, the t of the power law estimate
improves as well, from 0.97 to more than 0.99. This is once again consistent with theory: because
exporting behavior induces deviations from a precise power law in the sample of exporting rms,
the t is less tight initially. However, a power law becomes a better and better description of the
exporters' size distribution as we constrain the sample to larger and larger rms.
4.2 Sector-Level Evidence
The model in Section 2 can be interpreted as describing an individual sector rather than the whole
economy. Thus, we should expect to see at sector level the same patterns found above for the
aggregate. Examining the predictions of the heterogeneous rms model at the industry level can
also reassure us that the results are not driven by compositional eects. In addition, we can exploit
dierences in trade openness by sector to provide further evidence consistent with theory.
Table 3 reports the results of estimating the power laws in rm size for exporters and non-
exporters by sector, the industry-level equivalent of Table 2. For compactness, we only report the
log-rank-log-size estimates, though the PDF and the CDF estimators deliver virtually identical
results. It is clear that the eects we illustrate in the economy-wide data are present at the sector
level. In every one of the 25 tradeable sectors, the power law coecient for non-exporting rms is
larger in absolute value than the coecient for exporting rms. In 22 out of 25 of these sectors, this
dierence is statistically signicant. In fact, if anything the dierence between the two coecients is
11slightly more pronounced at the sector level: while in the aggregate results of Table 2 the dierence
between the two coecients is 0.29, at sector level the mean dierence between these coecients
is 0.35.
An auxiliary prediction of theory is that the exporting behavior will induce greater deviations
in the value of power law exponents in sectors that are more open to trade. Figure 7(a) investigates
this prediction. On the vertical axis is the percentage dierence between the power law coecient
for domestic sales and the traditional power law coecient as estimated on the total sales of all rms
in the sector:
dom total
dom , where dom is the coecient obtained from tting a power law on domestic
sales only, and total is the exponent of the power law for total sales. On the horizontal axis is the
overall sector openness: the ratio of exports to total sales in the sector. For ease of comparison,
the non-tradeable sectors are denoted by hollow dots, and the tradeable sectors by solid dots. The
gure also reports the OLS t through the data. The underlying power law coecients and exports
to sales ratios are reported in Appendix Table A2.
The relationship is striking: the more open the sector, the greater is the dierence between
the conventional power law coecient { estimated on total sales { and the power law coecient
estimated on domestic sales only. The simple bivariate correlation between these two variables
is a remarkable 0.92. Similarly, Figure 7(b) plots the relationship between sector openness and
the dierence between the conventional power law coecient and the coecient estimated on non-
exporting rms only:
nonex total
nonex , where nonex is the power law coecient estimated on the sales of
nonexporting rms only, reported in column 5 of Table 3. Once again, the positive and signicant
relationship is quite pronounced: the correlation between the two variables is 0.72.
The variation in the impact of exporting behavior on power law coecients across sectors thus
provides remarkable supporting evidence that international trade changes the distribution of rm
size in systematic and predictable ways.
4.3 Corrections and Quantitative Implications
What is the economic signicance of these dierences? In section 2.1, we show analytically that the
power law exponent in rm size, , is related to 
" 1, where  is the parameter in the distribution of
productivities, and " is the elasticity of substitution between goods. As such, estimates of  have
been used in empirical and quantitative analyses to pin down this combination of parameters (see,
e.g. Helpman et al. 2004, Chaney 2008). Above, we showed that estimating power laws without
regard for exporting behavior implies that the estimated  does not actually equal 
" 1.
However, it is still possible to recover a reliable estimate of 
" 1 in two simple ways suggested
by theory. The rst relies on the observation that in the sample of non-exporting rms only,  does
in fact correspond to 
" 1. Thus, in any dataset that contains explicit information on whether or
not a rm exports (without necessarily reporting the value of exports), 
" 1 can be estimated by
12restricting attention to non-exporting rms.
The non-exporters estimates of Table 2 do precisely that. Comparing the conventional estimates
of  that are based on all rms in the economy (Table 1) with the estimates based on the non-
exporting sample (columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 2) thus allows us to get a sense of how far o are
the conventional estimates of 
" 1. In practice, for the CDF and PDF estimators, this does not turn
out to be a large dierence: the Table 1 coecients for all rms are only about 3.6% o from the
\true" estimates of 
" 1, that are based on the non-exporting rms only. For the log-rank-log-size
estimator, this dierence is larger, 20%.
The second correction suggested by theory is that for all rms, the domestic sales will obey
the power law with exponent 
" 1. Thus, another conceptually correct way of estimating this
combination of parameters is to t a power law on domestic sales for all rms, non-exporting and
exporting. Table 4 reports the results. Several things are worth noting. First, as predicted by
theory, the power law estimates in Table 4 are higher in absolute value than in Table 1 for total
sales. Once again, we see that ignoring exporting behavior leads to power law estimates that are too
low. Second, the coecients in Table 4 are quite similar to the non-exporter coecients of Table
2, suggesting that the two dierent corrections we propose deliver mutually consistent results.
5 Conclusion
It has been known since at least the 1940's and the 1950's that the probability distributions for
many economic variables can be described by power laws. Fifty years on, renewed interest in
the causes and consequences of these phenomena coincides with the advancement and application
of theoretical frameworks that model heterogeneous rms. This paper argues that theories of
heterogeneous rms can fruitfully inform the empirics of estimating power laws in rm size. We set
up a simple version of such a model, and show that international trade aects the distribution of
rm size systematically: the exponent of the power law among exporting rms is lower than among
the non-exporting rms. We then use a comprehensive dataset of French rms to demonstrate that
this prediction holds very strongly in the data.
Two corrections can be implemented to obtain power law estimates consistent with theory.
The main advantage of the methods proposed here is simplicity: all they require is an appropriate
modication of either the estimation sample, or the variable to be used. In practice, it turns out
that at the economy-wide level, the estimated corrected coecients do not dier much from the
traditional, unadjusted ones. One possible conclusion from this exercise is that if one is interested
in a ballpark estimate of the extent of rm size heterogeneity, systematic biases introduced by
exporting behavior are not that large. However, we would caution against generalizing this con-
clusion to other countries and settings. For instance, the impact of exporting behavior could be
13much greater in smaller countries, or in developing ones, or in individual industries. Thus, a more
general approach to obtaining reliable estimates would be to implement the corrections suggested
in this paper.
14Appendix A Proof of Proposition 1
Proof:
From (5), the probability of exports, conditioning on domestic size is:
P (Xi > 0 j Di) = H (Di):
Call pY the density of a generic variable Y . We start from the postulate (e.g., coming from random
growth) that the distribution of baseline sizes is:
pD (x) = kx  11x>D; (A.1)
where k is an integration constant, k = D.
We next calculate the distribution of exports. To do that, we consider an arbitary \test function"
g (continuous and non-zero over on a compact set), and calculate the expected value of a test
function g (X). First, given (5),
E [g (Xi) j Di] = (1   H (Di))g (0) + H (Di)g (Di):
Therefore,
E [g (Xi)] = E [E [g (Xi) j Di]]




(1   H (D))g (0)pD (D) + H (D)g (D)pD (D)dD
E [g (Xi)] =
Z
D




















Equation (A.2) implies that the probability measure associated with x has a point mass
R
D (1   H (D))pD (D)











 for x > 0. Hence, the density associated with the re-
striction of the exports to X > 0 is












for a constant k0 such that
R
x>0 pX (x)dx = 1. With the Pareto density of baseline sizes (A.1),






for a constant K = k0k.
We can calculate the distribution of Si using a similar approach. From (6), a reasoning analogous
to the one used for exports shows:













15Thus, with the Pareto specication for D:
pS (x) = kx  1









1x>(1+)D + kx  11D<x<(1+)D: (A.3)
We see a Pareto shape in the tails, but modulated by the export probability function H.
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18Table 1. Power Law in Firm Size, All Firms
(1) (2) (3)
CDF PDF ln(Rank-0.5)
 1.017 1.019 0.825
(0.032) (0.031) (0.003)
R2 0.990 0.998 0.991
No. of rms 157,084 157,084 157,084
Notes: This table reports the estimates of power laws in rm size (total sales), using the three methods
described in the text. Column (1) estimates the CDF of the power law specied in equation (9). Column
(2) estimates the PDF of the power law specied in equation (10). Column 3 regresses log(Rank-0.5) of the
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































21Table 4. Power Law in Firm Size, All Firms, Domestic Sales Only
(1) (2) (3)
CDF PDF ln(Rank-0.5)
 1.048 1.055 0.869
(0.030) (0.027) (0.003)
R2 0.992 0.998 0.992
No. of rms 157,084 157,084 157,084
Notes: This table reports the estimates of power laws in rm size (domestic sales), using the three methods
described in the text. Column (1) estimates the CDF of the power law specied in equation (9). Column
(2) estimates the PDF of the power law specied in equation (10). Column 3 regresses log(Rank-0.5) of the
rm in the size distribution on log of its size (Gabaix and Ibragimov 2008).
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Figure 3. The Analytical Power Law in the Melitz-Pareto Model: Stochastic Export Entry Costs
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23Figure 4. Power Laws in the Distribution of Firm Size, All Firms
ln(Pr(Si>s)) = −1.017ln(s)+ 7.721
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Notes: This gure reports the estimated power laws in rm size based on total sales and all rms. The
power laws are estimated with two dierent methods, the cdf (panel a) and the pdf (panel b).























































Notes: This gure reports the estimated power laws in rm size for exporting and non-exporting rms
separately. The power laws are estimated with two dierent methods, the CDF (panel a) and the pdf (panel
b).

















































1.0e+03 2.5e+03 5.0e+03 1.0e+04 2.0e+04 4.0e+04
Lower Sales Cutoff
(b)
Notes: The top panel of this Figure depicts the power law coecient estimated on exporting rms on the
vertical axis, plotted against the minimum sales cuto on the horizontal axis. The dashed horizontal line
in the top panel is the power law coecient for domestic rms. The bottom panel depicts the concomitant
evolution in the R
2's of the estimates.
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Exports/Sales
(b)
Notes: The Figure plots the dierences between the power law coecients at sector level against trade
openness. In both panels, sector-level exports relative to total sales are on the horizontal axis. In the top
panel, on the vertical axis is the percentage dierence between the power law exponent estimated on domestic
sales only and the power law exponent estimated on total sales:
dom total
dom . In the bottom panel, on the
vertical axis is the percentage dierence between the power law exponent estimated on sales of non-exporting
rms only and the power law exponent estimated on total sales of all rms:
nonex total
nonex . The non-tradeable
sectors are denoted by hollow dots, and the tradeable sectors by solid dots. The straight line is the OLS t
through the data.
27Table A1. Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Firms
No. of rms Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Total Sales 157,084 14,024 254,450 751 6.16E+07
Export Sales 157,084 2,894 89,232 0 1.95E+07
Non-Exporting Firms
No. of rms Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Total Sales 90,006 6,434 86,009 751 1.67E+07
Exporting Firms
No. of rms Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Total Sales 67,078 24,208 376,185 752 6.16E+07
Export Sales 67,078 6,777 136,456 1 1.95E+07
Notes: This table presents the summary statistics for the variables used in the estimation. Sales gures are
in thousands of Euros.
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